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Abstract: Fallacy theory has three significant challenges to it: the generality, scope, and negativity problems. To the 
generality problem, the connection between general types of bad arguments and tokens is a matter of refining the use 
of the vocabulary. To the scope problem, the breadth of fallacy’s instances is cause for development. To the 
negativity problem, fallacy theory must be coordinated with a program of adversariality-management.    
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1. Introduction  
 
Fallacy theory is the convergence of three broad programs in the study of argument. First is the 
first-order research program of defining fallacy, taxonomizing and finding new types. Second is 
the pedagogical program of teaching some taxonomy of fallacies as part of critical thinking 
classes. Third is the meta-theoretical program of articulating what the relationship is between 
understanding fallacies and the broader program of understanding arguments and reasoning.   
Fallacy theory has come under considerable criticism of late. There are three rough 
classes of objection. First is the generality problem: fallacy theory’s generality loses its 
connection to actual argument instances, but its particularity loses normative bite. Second is the 
scope problem: it seems the number of fallacious forms is unlimited—here is no well-defined 
domain of study. Third is the negativity problem: foregrounding failure and the vocabulary of 
criticism promotes argumentative adversariality, and as a consequence contributes to bad 
argumentative practice. 
This paper is a reply to these challenges. To the generality problem, the reply is that 
fallacy theory provides a vocabulary for critical evaluation in discussion. All normative 
vocabulary will have some version of the scope problem; but this problem actually calls for more 
refined vocabulary, not the rejection of it. To the scope problem: the fact that there are more 
varieties of fallacious argument is good news for the discipline, not bad. To the negativity 
problem, the reply is that argumentative exchange is best conceived as dialectically minimally 
adversarial, and so fallacy theory must then provide tools for articulation of criticism and also 
the tools for management and de-escalation of critical discussion.   
My plan here is to briefly survey what I see as the three domains of fallacy theory, then 
turn to what I take as the three main programs of criticism. Finally, my modest defense of fallacy 
theory will be to concede much of the critical bite of the cases against fallacy theory but to hold 
that these are welcome occasions for reform and reconception. 
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2. Fallacy theory and its components  
 
Fallacy theory is a subdomain of argumentation theory or informal logic, which is a research 
program devoted to the study of argumentative normativity. A commonplace is to contrast the 
focus of this broader domain with that of formal or deductive logic; the latter concerned with 
conditions for argumentative validity and the former concerned with the weaker forms of support 
for arguments as products and other procedural issues with argument as process. As far as it 
goes, this is a useful estimation of the broader domain, and fallacy theory is the more restricted 
study of ways support fails or procedural rules of argument are broken. Exactly how to even 
thematize these failures is precisely one of the core issues of fallacy theory. We all know that 
fallacy theory is a subdomain of informal logic focused on argumentative failure, but what 
constitutes that failure is a matter of debate within fallacy theory. And so, there are divisions 
about how to even define what a fallacy is. There is the ‘standard treatment,’ as identified by 
Hamlin (1970) that fallacies are arguments that seem valid but are not. There is the broadened 
version, as developed by Johnson (1987), that a fallacy is an argument that violates one of the 
standards for good argument and occurs with sufficient frequency to merit being classified (p. 
246). And the pragma-dialectical perspective, as seen with van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(1987) that fallacies are discussion moves that threaten the resolution of a dispute—and in 
particular, they are violations of rules of critical discussion (p. 297). Alternately, a fallacy may 
be, as Walton (1995) terms it, the misuse of an argument scheme (p. 15). There are, of course, 
more varieties of definition, and they generally depend on the theory of argumentative 
normativity on offer, as all theory of fallacy is a theory of how one fails to do what one ought in 
argument. Disagreement about argumentative norms yields disagreement about what it is to 
break those norms or fail their demand. 
The second focus for fallacy theory is about how informal logic is taught in the 
classroom. Again, a contrast with formal logic is useful. With natural deduction, the focus is on 
rules of good inference and their systematicity, particularly in construction of proofs. Little 
systematic effort is put into the articulation of ways to fail at the objectives of proof. In contrast, 
the overwhelming amount of time and energy put into classroom work in informal logic is on 
fallacies—how arguments fail. And so training for students is often in the form of fallacy-
spotting, not argument construction. Work in fallacy theory informs pedagogy in the sense that 
well-taxonomized and explained accounts of fallacy allow students a rich interpretive framework 
for discussion. The objective of looking for 'fallacies in the wild’ from the pages of newspapers 
and out of mouths of talking heads, regularly yields substantive class discussion. 
The third, metatheoretical, component of fallacy theory is the task of articulating how 
findings in fallacy theory inform our broader research of argumentative and discursive axiology.  
What does a certain fallacy reveal about argumentative norms? What does the prevalence of a 
class of vicious dialectical tropes tell us about our society? How does argument, even though we 
are regularly bad at it, fit with democracy? A natural thought is that certain argumentative 
failures are pregnant with meaning about what argument should be, how it should work. And so, 
out of a few object lessons in how not to argue, we have information about how to argue. And so, 
a kind of reflective equilibrium arises between our theories of argument and our systematic 
treatment of fallacy. Well, at least that’s the hope. 
I will next present the three main families of objections to fallacy theory, and one thing I 
think arises from their presentation together is a familiar picture, at least to philosophers. It is a 
picture of a domain of study that has as one of its central and most fractious issues the question 
SCOTT F. AIKIN 
 
 3 
of what it is about and whether it is worth doing at all. Ever since Thales had his pratfall in the 
well, philosophers regularly have had to answer these questions for themselves: what are 
philosophy’s objects? What are its standards? Is an education in it a hindrance to being a useful 
human being? And so it goes for fallacy theory. 
 
3. The generality problem 
 
The generality problem for fallacy theory is an instantiation of the wider problem of how norms 
govern particular actions. Norms are general, if not universal prescriptions. Yet particulars, 
insofar as they are particular, never are mere instantiations of universals, but are always roughly 
classed as such.1 Many the nominalist has said universals are mere words. So a version of this 
challenge arises for fallacy theory. Maurice Finocchiaro (1981/2005) captures the thought: 
 
[T]here probably are no common errors in reasoning. That is, logically incorrect 
arguments maybe are common, but common types of logically incorrect 
arguments probably are not. (p. 113) 
 
In a similar vein, Boudry, Paglieri and Pigliucci  (2015) pose what they call the Fallacy Fork: 
 
[O]n the one hand, if fallacies are construed as demonstrably invalid forms of 
reasoning, then they have very limited applicability in real life (few actual 
instances). On the other hand, if our definitions of fallacies are sophisticated 
enough to capture real-life complexities, they can no longer be held up as an 
effective tool for discriminating good and bad forms of reasoning.  
 
Similarly, Massey (1981) charges that the “myriad and intricate schemes for classifying fallacies 
suggests there is little behind the science of fallacy … [T]here is no theory of fallacy 
whatsovever” (p. 491). At best, fallacies are ‘subjective’ and at worst they are empty, as there are 
simply no instances of them beyond what occur in textbooks. 
For sure, the history of fallacy theory is testament to the fact that it is usually an ad hoc 
repository of pet peeves of intellectuals about the linguistic behavior of others. Aristotle’s Topics 
and Sophistical Refutations certainly read as such.  And the current work in fallacy theory in 
developing new vocabularies of dialectical criticism is for the most part reactionary scholarly 
work of seeing patterns of argumentative vice in the buzzing blooming confusion of public 
reason-exchange. 
The strong reply is given by Johnson (1987), that we should eliminate the subjectivity of 
fallacy theory in the same way that logic should resist psychologism: fallacy theory “should be 
purged of its subjective and psychologistic nuances” (p. 245).  And so the ‘seems’ talk of fallacy 
theory (that of taking a fallacy to be an argument that only seems valid but isn’t) is to be 
eliminated. 
But this is much too strong a solution, if only because we want fallacy theory to do some 
double-duty in theorizing fallacies. That is, we want to not only (a) explain why the argument 
                                                 
1 Versions of this problem arise regularly in axiology.  This is why Aristotle even after he holds that ethical norms 
must be universal in a sense, requires that judgments of actions must have sensitivity to the particulars (NE 
1098a.33, and see Leibowitz, 2011). In the 20th century, the issues arose in ethics with the challenge of particularism 
(as in Prichard, 1912) and in epistemology with the generality problem for reliabilism (Conee & Feldman, 1998).   
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given is not good, but also (b) explain why people continue to give it and accept it, too. This is 
why seems itself appears ineliminable in fallacy theory: we want to be able to explain why we 
fall for certain bad arguments, and ‘seems’ talk is the best vocabulary for illusions of 
argumentative quality. This double-duty program, further, is the reason why fallacy theory must 
invoke types in order to evaluate the tokens of the fallacy forms. The type instantiates an 
argument scheme that, given informal factors, will be appropriate or inappropriate. And the type, 
given the way we (or many) happen to reason in particular circumstances, appeals to us in 
particular tokens. 
The modest reply, then, is that fallacy theory comprises of a program of identifying 
groups of argument-types that have rough family resemblances among their tokens.2 Notice that 
this rough notion of the normative category of fallacy is analogous to the moral categories of 
criticism. Negligence is a property of a class of actions one might find objectionable, and though 
negligence takes many forms, there is still the rough notion of could have and should have been 
more attentive that comprises the class. So too with theft, mendacity, and selfishness.   
The generality problem, as posed by Boudry, Paglieri and Pigliucci’s Fallacy Fork 
certainly captures the problem of critical vocabulary being either too specific to be statements of 
rules or too general to have any obvious connection to real life arguments. But consider that once 
one learns the language of fallacy-challenge, the charge of fallacy is part of what Johnson (1987) 
calls “initial probing” in critical discussion. Fallacy theory is the development of a metalanguage 
for argumentative criticism, and learning the language of fallacy theory is not just that of making 
fallacy-charges, but of putting nuance on an argument, requiring clarification, developing in a 
critical discussion.3 The reality is that vanishingly few actual arguments come in textbook fallacy 
form. This both fallacy theorists and critics of fallacy theory avow. But that does not make the 
language of fallacy-assessment irrelevant. When it can be plausibly charged that an argument 
instance is a token of some fallacy type, then it is incumbent on those who either give or accept it 
to defend against the charge—some relevant piece of evidence is brought to light or the 
clarification of a connection may arise, or they may have little or nothing to say. The point is that 
fallacy-vocabulary and the theory behind it is in the service of the reason-and-challenge structure 
of argument-exchange. As a consequence, the generality problem is both bad news and good 
news. 
The generality problem is bad news in the sense that, because our evaluative categories 
must instantiate general normative outlooks and specific instance emphasis, they will have 
penumbral edges and overlapping cases—this is why it is often so difficult to classify some bad 
argument instances. 
The good news is that in the general forms fallacies take, fallacy theory can provide 
explanations for why some argument correction can be so difficult and can provide roadmaps for 
critical discussion in light of how the arguments are challenged and so on. The phenomenon 
described is itself complex and variegated; so, too, must be its description. Thus, a modest reply 
to the generality problem. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Fogelin and Duggan (1987, p. 256) for this model, and Wittgenstein (1953, S67) for the reference to ‘family 
resemblances.’ 
3 See van Laar (2008) and Anderson, Aikin, and Casey (2012) for developments of the notion that fallacy-charges 
play dialectical roles in the clarification of views. 
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4. The scope problem 
 
The scope problem is simply that fallacy theory has no clear demarcational criteria—what 
distinguishes fallacy theory from culture criticism, political philosophy, or rhetorical analysis? In 
light of how the modest solution to the generality problem was that fallacy theory has, as a 
matter of course, rough terms and open-ended evaluative criteria, the scope problem for fallacy 
theory becomes all the more trenchant. It seems, on its face, that the modest fallacy-theoretic 
reply to generality amplifies the scope problem that there is no clear limit to what fallacy theory 
should evaluate, it is, by its own description, an incomplete task. 
For example, Catherine Hundleby observes that the domain of most fallacy theory is from 
the perspective of those who are roughly social equals trading reasons with other social equals.  
This, for sure, is a relevant domain, but it is not exhaustive of the scope of bad and recurrent 
argument types. Hundleby (2009) observes that too much is left out—there are ‘androcentric 
fallacies’ (p. 2), and there is a growing literature on how too many from underrepresented groups 
are not given their due in critical dialogue, beginning with epistemic (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 
2013) and extending to argumentative (Bondy, 2010; Rooney 2012; Hundleby 2013) injustices.  
Moreover, even within the standard model of fallacy theory, it seems that given the modest 
solution above, there could be, for every fallacy, particular sub-instances of the fallacy (as seen 
in the multiplying versions of ‘straw man fallacies’).4 
From a purely theoretical perspective, the scope problem is really nothing but good 
news—the variety of argumentative error and systematic explication is wider than anticipated 
and seems (assuming the examples above are right) to bear significant connection to pressing 
social issues of the day. Fallacy theory, like critical thinking more broadly, finds its way into 
anywhere we humans reason (or at least purport to). Consequently, there is much for the fallacy 
theorist to do: new vocabularies to devise, new strategies of argumentative repair to develop, and 
programs of connecting these to standing taxonomies of fallacy and argumentative theory. The 
scope problem, from this perspective, is just a manifestation of the fecundity of the research 
program. 
 The bad news is the return of the generality problem. How applicable is this 
progressively more complicated machinery of argument-evaluation? Recall that the modest 
solution to the generality problem was to argue that the intersecting and penumbral categories 
were part of all normative-evaluative discourse, and so managing these categories requires 
regular application of principles like those of conceptual tolerance (that some concepts are 
gradable and intersecting instead of absolute and exclusive). The scope problem can be restated 
now as a special instance of the generality problem: fallacy theory, in adopting penumbral, 
intersecting, and expanding categories for fallacy, is on the way to an impossibly unwieldy 
classificatory and critical system. In pursuing the specific-critical line in instances of bad 
reasoning, the general program of identifying fallacy tokens of types has been foregone. The 
modest reply, then, is that of identifying the objective of developing a metalanguage of challenge 
for reasoning. The phenomenon of challengeable reasoning is complex, and so the vocabulary 
will be, too. How fine-grained the vocabulary is depends on the scrutiny to which we are 
subjecting the reasoning (or how dialectically deep the challenges and replies have gone), and 
how many new fallacy forms we wish to introduce depends on what, precisely, the critical 
project is out to accomplish. The language of logic is an instrument of rational self-
consciousness, and depending on what needs to be made explicit, the vocabulary’s detail can be 
                                                 
4 As seen, for example, in Aikin and Casey (2011) and Lewinski and Oswald (2013). 
SCOTT F. AIKIN 
 
 6 
brought to bear or forborne. And so, this return to the modest solution is modest in that it 
concedes a good deal of the scope problem. The objective of fallacy theory must be defined and 
refined against the issue or problem’s backdrop of what the points of argument-analysis in the 
contexts are.   
 
5. The negativity problem 
 
Fallacy theory is a systematic view of argumentative error. The vocabulary of fallacies, as a 
consequence, is univocally critical. There are two consequences of this negative-emphatic view. 
The first is that fallacy theory has a problem with misplaced emphasis—we should not only be 
looking for ways to criticize arguments, but to construct good ones and improve bad ones. The 
second is that fallacy theory, in its negativity, is complicit with (and in many cases actively 
promotes) the excessive adversariality of argumentative exchange. 
 Catherine Hundleby (2009; 2010; 2012) and Phyllis Rooney (2010; 2013) have argued 
along both of these lines. Because of fallacy theory’s negative valence, negative consequences 
ensue. Hundleby (2010) observes that: 
 
The oppositional nature of fallacy-allegation … lends itself to formulations 
according to the politically regressive and epistemologically archaic Adversary 
Paradigm. (p. 280) 
 
Hundleby (2010) further observes that the way fallacies are regularly presented in textbooks 
offer “no suggestion of argument repair” (p. 289) and yield “pin the tail on the argument” 
exercises for students. Phyllis Rooney (2010), similarly, argues that the adversarial paradigm is 
epistemically and argumentatively stunted: 
 
[T]he Adversary Paradigm either leads to bad reasoning … or … it sustains a 
more limited range of reasoning and argument forms … (p. 205) 
 
In short, the negativity of fallacy-identification is part of and contributes to the Adversarial 
Paradigm, which obscures the goals of truth-seeking.5  
The modest defense of fallacy theory is to concede the negativity problem. Fallacy 
theory, taught exclusively, yields sharks, not arguers. It is a common phenomenon, when 
teaching a survey of informal logic, to have students ask whether there are any good arguments.  
One turns them loose on their families over Thanksgiving only to hear, upon their return, that all 
they could do is call ad hominem with their politics-talking uncles.6 Hundleby (2010) correctly 
observes that informal logic is overwhelmingly taught as only the taxonomy of fallacies, and this 
is precisely the problem. As Hundleby (2010) also argues, this is not a reason to reject fallacy 
theory, but a reason to revise our conception of it and to reform the way we teach it (p. 303).  
This revision can be either modest or minimal. 
There are two parts to the modest reply to the negativity problem: (i) the mutuality thesis, 
and (ii) the intrinsic adversariality thesis. Call defenses without intrinsic adversariality, but with 
                                                 
5 Others who have noted this connection are: Paul (1984), Johnson (2000, p. 243), Cohen (2004) and Boudry, 
Pagliery, and Pigliucci (2015).  
6 A useful analogy is that of the college sophomore who takes a course in PSYCH 101 and thereupon diagnoses 
every person in the dorm with OCD, schizophrenia, or depression.   
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mutuality, minimal replies. Modest replies require both—so if my case for (ii) fails, the minimal 
defense may still stand with the mutuality thesis. The mutuality thesis is that vocabularies of 
negative assessment are both part of normative vocabularies and important to their development; 
so insofar as there is ‘ought,’ there are correlate ‘ought-nots’ that clarify and provide 
application. The intrinsic adversariality thesis is that a minimal degree of dialectical 
adversariality is part of any argumentative exchange; so as a consequence, negativity is an 
inescapable component of argument, and any proper theory of argument must be poised for its 
proper management, not elimination. I will argue first for mutuality, then for the more 
controversial intrinsic adversariality thesis. 
The argument for mutuality begins with what I take to be a truism about normative 
practices—all normative practices have possible metalanguages formulable about them. For 
example, natural languages have grammars, but the language of grammar need only be possible.  
The same, I think, goes for logic. We have reasoning and arguments, but logic (formal and 
informal) is a metalanguage that makes the rules of the first-order practice explicit. So, the 
metalanguage of logic is a repository of all the rules we (ought to) follow when we reason.  All 
normative practices have the possibility of error in their performance, because being bound by 
rules doesn’t guarantee that they are followed. In the case of grammar, common errors are called, 
for example, run-on sentences, failures of parallel, subject-verb agreement, and so on. The same 
goes for fallacy theory—common error types are theorized and given names. The point of many 
of these metalanguages is not only to make the norms explicit and have a theory of their 
systematicity (and perhaps also a systematic view of the errors, too, as we see in fallacy 
taxonomies), but to facilitate function of the first-order normative practice. That is, with both 
grammar and logic, the point is to make the rules (and errors) explicit not just for its own sake, 
but for the sake of self-conscious and reflective normative practice. When a normative practice is 
self-consciously assessed, the variety of errors clarifies the norms and the newly clarified norms 
allow practitioners to refine their first-order practices and also to find errors that had previously 
escaped their critical gaze from before. And so with a metalanguage, particularly the 
metalanguage of criticism, normative practices evolve as the kinds of practices we can self-
reflectively endorse. Fallacy theory, then, is part of a larger dialectic of rationality unfolding, the 
norms of reason exfoliating against where we make errors in trying to follow and enforce them.  
And so we see, for example, with fallacies, the importance of their belonging to a language of 
argument and argument-assessment, since they not only allow for criticism of particular 
arguments, but also for assessments of well-run dialectical exchange as being free of particular 
destructive fallacy forms and for the puzzlement when many bad arguments occur that don’t 
yield to easy classification.  
In this regard, consider the mutuality thesis to be an explicit version of the earlier modest 
replies to the generality and scope problems—fallacy theory amounts to the development of a 
critical metalanguage that is dialectically heuristic in its first-order application, but is in the 
service of broader norm clarification in its systematic articulation. The process is open-ended, 
because the phenomenon explained and discovered is a moving target—how we argue is, in 
many ways, influenced not only by what we are reasoning about, why we are reasoning, but also 
in terms of how we critically talk about our reasoning. The norms, then, will and ought to evolve 
as we develop norms of criticism. Negativity, then, is a necessary component of self-conscious 
reasoning. But this is not to say that the negativity should be our sole focus. In fact, the negative 
critical components of fallacy theory need to be integrated with other programs and objectives, 
such as argument repair, clarification of important but unacknowledged norms, and even 
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establishing understanding between deeply opposing views. Finally, it is important that those 
working on fallacies and teaching them to not let the focus on this critical edge of argumentative 
normativity become their sole pedagogical focus. In fact, it seems incumbent on those working in 
argumentation theory to write more textbooks integrating the fallacy-approach to argument 
assessment with the broader objectives of informal logic. Too many textbooks on informal logic 
and critical thinking are written by people with no detectable knowledge of the broader reach of 
argumentation theory beyond the fallacy systematics.7 
The intrinsic adversariality thesis is considerably more controversial than the mutuality 
thesis. Both Hundleby (2009; 2010; 2013) and Rooney (2010; 2012) have argued that 
adversariality may be a dominant paradigm, but it is both a bad one and an optional one.  
Consequently, it should be foregone. More cooperative communicative models are available, so 
intrinsic adversariality is indefensible. Further, it is clear that the presence of adversariality in 
argumentative exchange can subvert the broader epistemic objectives of argument (that of 
pursuing the truth and development of understanding), as it is clear that many will forego 
argument’s adversarial program who are not comfortable with it, adversariality puts many 
disadvantaged groups at further disadvantage, and it creates retrenchment in the face of further 
criticism. 
Hundleby and Rooney’s arguments target primarily Trudy Govier’s case for minimal 
adversariality, showing that, as Hundleby (2013) puts it, “we may exchange reasons without 
opposing one another’s ideas – never mind opposing one another personally” (p. 239). This point 
is correct, and I think it scores the right critical challenge on Govier’s model. Govier’s model 
proceeds from the premise that if one’s audience must be on the receiving end of an argument, 
one must presume that they need correction. As Govier (1999) frames it: 
  
Those who hold not-X are, with regard to the correctness of X and my argument 
for X, my opponents (p. 244). 
 
Again, my modest strategy is to concede Hundleby and Rooney’s point, but make the case for a 
revised notion of minimal adeversariality. Call this particular version dialectically minimal 
adversariality. I can provide the view only in outline here, but I’ve defended a version of it in my 
(2011) article, and I have further material in the works. Here is a schematized version of the 
case: 
 
1. If one is arguing for a view, p, then p is either controversial or potentially so. 
2. If a view is controversial, then there is someone who either holds that p is false 
or dubitable. If p is potentially controversial, there is a possible reasonable 
perspective that takes it that p is false or dubitable. Call any actual or potential 
holder of these perspectives W. 
3. W is the target audience for the argument for p.  
4. If W holds that p is false or dubitable, then W does so for (one or more of) the   
following reasons: 
(a) W has rebutting reasons against p (showing that p is false, or showing 
that some other claim, q, is true, which is a contrary of p), or 
                                                 
7 In this, I agree with Hundleby’s proposals that fallacy theory and fallacy instruction need to be taught alongside the 
broader research in informal logic, particularly that of argument repair (2010, p. 299).  
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(b) W has undercutting reasons against p (ones that show that p, given the 
evidence, is not likely true or reasonable) 
5. If one takes W as one’s target audience, then one addresses critical challenges 
with either: 
(a) vindicating reasons—reasons that establish p in full, or 
(b) revising reasons—reasons that establish p*, which is a weaker or more    
defensible version of p. 
6. Therefore, if one is arguing for p, then one is giving reasons within the 
following dialectical complex: 
 
        Addressing \ In form of Vindicating reasons Revising Reasons 
To W’s Undercutting challenges V-p to U R-p* to U 
To W’s Rebutting challenges V-p to R R-p* to R 
 
7. All reasons within the dialectical complex are reasons answering reasonable 
challenges. 
8. Therefore, All argument-giving is with the objective of answering reasonable 
challenges.  
 
Call this revision of Govier’s minimal adversariality view dialectically minimal adversariality.  
The only adversariality in this model is the matter of weighing the force of the better reasons, 
and so this is minimal and only dialectically adversarial. The upshot of this argument is that the 
adversariality of addressing critical challenges to a view is an essential part of argumentation.  
One must either speak to a critic or construct a motivating reason for marshalling one’s reasons 
in the form of a potential challenge. Moreover, there is nothing to this program that excludes the 
Gricean virtues of cooperation, as it surely takes the cooperative principle to interpret the 
significant of challenges, objections, and critical questions.  
If this line of reasoning is correct, the crucial element to training in fallacy theory is to 
mitigate the escalation of adversariality from, on the one hand, the useful and productive sources 
of critical feedback for argument to work toward, on the other, the exchange of insults. So long 
as the cooperative exchange is critical discussion, dialectically minimal adversariality need not 
be any impediment to arguments given with good will.8 Moreover, notice that there can be 
collaborative elements that emerge from these considerations such that one can truly value 
critical questions and challenge, not as personal attacks or even rejections of one’s point of view, 
but as the kind of useful resistance needed to craft the case for any controversial view. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Fallacy theory, properly framed, is a domain with contested target phenomena, and as a 
consequence, contested applicability and normativity. This comes as no surprise to anyone 
familiar with philosophy’s long history of fits and starts on a variety of issues. The generality 
and scope problems are representative of a requirement that domains of research be well-ordered 
and (at least potentially) finite, and these are reasonable expectations for many areas. But the 
phenomenon of reasoning is a moving target, as our vocabularies of evaluation change the 
                                                 
8 See Aikin (2011) for models of argumentative escalation and accounts of its mitigation.   
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phenomenon. In fact, the important thing is that they do change the phenomena. That people now 
invoke ad hominem attacks or slippery slopes in the midst of arguments is testament to the 
contribution fallacy theory makes to self-conscious argumentation. Further, the negativity of this 
critical vocabulary is itself intrinsic to this program of bringing normative practices to self-
consciousness. The terms of critique are part of both the first-order practice of argument (as the 
intrinsic minimal dialectical adversariality argument runs) and of our grasp of that practice as 
rule-bound (as the mutuality argument runs). The conclusion, then, is that fallacy theory is messy 
and adversarial, and necessarily so. What’s required of us, then, as argumentation theorists, is not 
that we reject fallacy theory or reform it to the point of being non-adversarial, but that we 
develop research and teaching programs that (a) maintain a minimum of well-orderedness to 
research and (b) mitigate the potentiality of adversarial escalation in argument. So programs of 
argument repair alongside fallacy identification must be taught, and we must keep track of the 
way our critical vocabulary returns to and influences the practices it is designed to describe.   
 
Acknowledgements: Thanks to John Casey, Catherine Hundleby, and Robert B. Talisse for 
feedback on earlier drafts of this essay.  
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